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From an international perspective, another meeting of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) leaders will invariably pass as a non-event. However, the 4-6 January SAARC summit is 
significant because of its venue, Islamabad, where Indian and Pakistani heads of state will meet after an 
intense phase of mutual hostility. The latest round of India-Pakistan reconciliation started on 23 
November 2003, when Pakistani Prime Minister Mir Zaffarullah Khan Jamali announced a unilateral 
ceasefire along the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir and expressed his willingness to accept a series of 
bilateral confidence building measures (CBMs), several of which had earlier been suggested by India.[1] 
The CBMs included starting a bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffrabad, a ferry service between 
Mumbai and Karachi, the revival of air links, and re-opening a previously existing rail route linking 
Khokhrapar (in Rajasthan, India) and Munnabao (in Sindh, Pakistan).[2] With India's acceptance, the 
guns fell silent across the LoC on 25 November for the first time in two decades. At several outposts 
along the LoC, Indian and Pakistani soldiers celebrated the Islamic festival of Id by exchanging sweets 
instead of targeting each other with shells. 
It is premature to say that the new India-Pakistan rapprochement will lead to lasting peace in the region. 
The current improvement in Indo-Pakistani relations is caused by a combination of outside pressure and 
domestic compulsions. The current ceasefire is a tactical reprieve, which will last through the SAARC 
summit. A likely outcome of this rapprochement would be a managed level of India-Pakistan hostility and 
increased political and economic interaction. 
Contributing Factors 
The Vajpayee peace initiative is guided by the logic that the military will continue to play the dominant role 
in the existing political power structure in Pakistan. Hence, delaying engagement with the existing regime 
is imprudent. Vajpayee's broad political backing gives him sufficient domestic support to negotiate difficult 
issues with difficult neighbors—witness the success of the comprehensive dialogue between India and 
China. Having failed in earlier attempts to negotiate peace with Pakistan, New Delhi has adopted a new 
strategy relying on positive unilateral initiatives, which can be reciprocated quickly by Pakistan.[3] Such 
an approach circumvents lengthy negotiations that can be scuttled by hardliners in either capital, and 
instead provides diplomatic options to maintain forward momentum in reducing Indo-Pakistani hostility. 
The Pakistani government's initially guarded response to Vajpayee's CBM proposals and later 
announcement of a unilateral ceasefire surprised everyone. A leading Indian daily assessed that 
Pakistan's abrupt turnaround could be interpreted in three ways. Cynically, it could be argued that 
Pakistan has little to lose and much to gain by adopting such a posture during this part of the year, when 
adverse weather conditions restrict its ability to assist militants in Kashmir. Jamali's overture thus aims to 
win international support while simultaneously putting India on the defensive. Upcoming elections in India 
may limit New Delhi's ability to offer concessions, allowing Pakistan to claim that any breakdown in the 
process is the result of Indian obduracy.[4]  
Another possibility is that this sudden change represents a dramatic shift in Pakistan's India policy. This 
possibility is supported by the recent crackdown on Pakistan-based extremist outfits: Islamabad banned 
six organizations, sealed their offices, froze their assets, and briefly detained their supporters. President 
Pervez Musharraf's call for joint ventures between Indian and Pakistani entrepreneurs also suggests a 
genuine change in attitude. His stated willingness to set "aside" the UN resolutions on Kashmir may 
indicate a more flexible negotiating stance.[5]  
The third possibility is that this is a tactical pause. Pakistan faces external pressure to cease support to 
extremist groups, and such support has generated instability within Pakistan. This line of argument notes 
diminishing results from supporting insurgency in Kashmir. Pakistan has not abandoned its strategic 
commitment to proxy war to achieve Kashmiri self-determination, a goal that is closely tied to Pakistan's 
self-image. Instead, the external and internal pressures have forced moderation to give Pakistan 
breathing space.[6]  
According to skeptics this tactical adjustment is attributable to international pressure and the evolving 
political and security situation in Kashmir. The recent U.S. $3 billion aid package, announced during 
Musharraf's September 2003 visit to Camp David, is linked to results on terrorism and socio-political 
changes in Pakistan. Islamabad has had difficulty in de-linking the Kashmir dispute from the broader 
global war on terror. Pakistan is under constant international pressure to do more to curb extremists 
operating from its territory. During her October 2003 visit to New Delhi, National Security Advisor 
Condoleezza Rice was emphatic: "it is absolutely the case that the infrastructure of terrorism has to be 
dismantled. It is absolutely the case that everybody needs to do more and Pakistan needs to do more to 
make sure that there cannot be terrorist acts taken in—from Pakistan or from Kashmir against targets 
there and we frequently talk to Pakistan about that."[7] The degree of policy change suggests external 
causes, as Pakistani activist Asma Jehangir observes: 
We are supposed to believe that the recent developments in India and Pakistan relations have come 
about without any external pressure, that a deep sense of anguish for the poor of the subcontinent has 
moved the leaders to give peace and friendship another chance. Suddenly Pakistan's custodians of 
nuclear weapons are willing to bury the 'baby' with their own hands and if India follows suit, all for the 
sake of 'peace.' Even ideologues are threatening to lead peace marches to Wagah. Such complete and 
sudden change of heart is only viewed in Indian and Pakistan films.[8]  
During the last few months the political and security situation in Kashmir has changed. The All Party 
Hurriyat Conference (APHC), the secessionist conglomerate in Jammu and Kashmir, split on 7 
September 2003. The mainstream APHC faction led by Maulavi Abbas Ansari favors talks with Delhi, 
while the Pakistan-supported faction led by Syed Ali Shah Geelani shuns talks. The Kashmiri populace 
welcomes the Indian government's offer of talks with the APHC. If talks do occur, Pakistan fears being 
sidelined. The security situation in Kashmir is returning to normal. A record number of tourists visited 
Jammu and Kashmir this summer, with Srinagar even hosting an August conference of chief ministers, 
presided over by the Indian Prime Minister. There was a perceptible decline in terrorist incidents last 
summer, which the state government attributed to rising public apathy towards militants and an effective 
counter-insurgency campaign. Indian military authorities reiterate that infiltration continues despite the 
cease-fire. However, the Indian army claims that enhanced surveillance and effective counter-insurgency 
measures have produced major successes against infiltrators.[9] The fencing along the LoC, which is only 
partially completed, also increases the difficulty of cross-LoC infiltration.  
A recent Washington, D.C.-based NGO study on Kashmir revealed that women in Kashmir regard the 
Kashmir crisis in terms of economic livelihood and employment rather than political democracy. Survey 
results indicated an abhorrence of violence and a preference for an end to the "gun culture" in Kashmiri 
society.[10] Intelligence inputs from Srinagar also suggest growing skepticism of Pakistani credibility by 
Kashmiri militants, following Pakistan's about-turn against the Taliban in 2001. All of these factors 
complicate Pakistan's strategy of using the freedom movement in Kashmir to foment trouble for India. 
The regional cooperative effort under the aegis of SAARC is another factor for the new peace initiative. 
Initiated in 1985 as an effort to promote regional economic cooperation, SAARC has been marred by 
bilateral confrontation between India and Pakistan. While the SAARC Charter specifically excludes 
"bilateral and contentious issues" from deliberations, Islamabad has used SAARC as a forum for such 
issues, impeding progress on economic cooperation. India declined to participate in the last SAARC 
summit scheduled in Islamabad in January 2003, causing its postponement. Pakistan wants the 
upcoming January 2004 summit to succeed. Also, despite their commonality of interests in the trade-
related issues at the World Trade Organization (WTO), bilateral discord has long-term costs for both India 
and Pakistan. Each realizes the utility of progress on trade-related issues in SAARC to provide coherence 
to their arguments at the WTO.  
Prospects 
On 15 August 2003, people from both countries gathered in a rare gesture at the international border and 
celebrated each others' independence days. A two-and-a-half-year-old Pakistani girl, Noor Fatima, whose 
successful heart operation symbolized peace efforts between India and Pakistan, came to India on July 
11 with her parents on the Lahore-Delhi bus service that was resumed after an 18-month suspension. 
Noor's case generated goodwill among the Indian populace and her story reverberated in the media on 
both sides of the border. A regular flow of similar cases is now coming from Pakistan to India for medical 
treatment. Parliamentary and business delegations have visited each others' capitals. Will this positive 
momentum be enough for peace? 
The ceasefire along the LoC should help restore a semblance of normalcy to the local populace, who 
suffer under incessant artillery duels. The ceasefire is more helpful for the people on the Pakistani side of 
the LoC because Kashmiri villagers living close to the LoC on the Pakistani side utilize arable land right 
up to the LoC, while land ahead of the army defenses on the Indian side is not cultivated. In addition, the 
civilian population of the Pakistani-held Neelum Valley will benefit from the ceasefire with the resumption 
of the normal traffic on the Neelum Valley road. India's interdiction of this road was one of the reasons for 
Pakistan's 1999 Kargil intrusion. The ceasefire creates a constituency for its continuation. If it lasts for any 
period of time, people will get used to normal life. Any disruption would likely cause public resentment. 
Also, with the two-way flow of people in Kashmir through the proposed Srinagar-Muzaffrabad bus, people 
on both sides will be able to see the ground realities, which are definitely different from the official 
propaganda they are used to hearing. 
The flip side is that the proposed CBMs are reversible without major consequences. Neither side has any 
stakes involved in implementing the proposed CBMs. Either side could stop the bus service, train, or ferry 
on any pretext. CBMs as part of a long-term process are more workable. For example, the resumption of 
normal trade and business investment would greatly raise the costs of a breakdown in relations. Absence 
of such commitment makes the current CBMs suspect from the very beginning. 
The current peace process is based upon an apparent belief of both governments that cooperation is 
better than confrontation. On 1 January 2004, Musharraf won legislative approval for his presidency. This 
provides him added legitimacy and political acceptance to negotiate with India on all crucial issues.[11] 
Repeated Indian peace offers cannot be brushed aside as mere political rhetoric. Various analysts have 
cited domestic political obstacles in India to meaningful dialogue with Pakistan. The recent political upturn 
in the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party's (BJP) fortunes despite Vajpayee's peace efforts with Pakistan 
undermine this line of thinking. Tensions astride the LoC have always remained part of Pakistan's 
strategy to keep the Kashmir issue alive. As a retired Indian army officer remarked, "It is not in Pakistan's 
interest to let the LoC become quiet and peaceful. They don't want the LoC to be dormant. They think that 
a dead issue would not form the basis of a solution. Therefore, they keep it on the boil so that it remains 
in newspaper headlines."[12] Earlier Indian and Pakistani efforts for tranquility along the LoC failed in the 
absence of mutual trust, partially because of Indian skepticism. This time the ceasefire has materialized 
because of Pakistan's offer. The current ceasefire is open-ended, with no time limits attached. The 
ceasefire will help Pakistan in negating Indian allegations that the Pakistan army provides covering fire for 
cross-LoC infiltration.  
Leaders of India and Pakistan have agreed to hold a bilateral meeting on the sidelines of the SAARC 
summit. While no dramatic outcomes are expected, this bilateral exchange will likely re-start a dialogue 
that has been dormant for over two years. From the Pakistani perspective the issue is Kashmir; and from 
the Indian perspective it is Pakistan's compulsive hostility towards India, one manifestation of which is 
continuing cross-LoC infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir. If terrorist violence continues in Jammu and 
Kashmir, India will find it hard to talk peace. If Pakistan fears that engagement with India is unrelated to 
Kashmir, it will not sustain the process.  
According to Stephen P. Cohen of the Brookings Institution, the peace effort is not likely to go very far 
because sooner or later something will disrupt the relationship: "It is still fragile. It could be a terrorist 
attack. It could be some insult that somebody issues to the other side and I think that the dialogue is at a 
very tenuous phase. So, I would assume that the dialogue would collapse as the previous dialogues 
have."[13] The International Crisis Group (ICG), a European think tank, argues that despite the latest 
CBMs between India and Pakistan, the potential for yet another Kashmir crisis that could result in armed 
conflict looms, since mutual distrust and hostility remain high, and both countries' substantive positions 
are rigid.[14] Such predictions are based upon the failures of past India-Pakistan peace initiatives. 
However, this time the outcome could be different because the peace moves are supported by a broad 
spectrum of the Pakistani establishment. Unlike in the past, the Pakistani business community feels 
confident in its ability to compete with its Indian counterparts. In addition, the recent electoral success of 
the BJP at the state level could result in holding early general elections in India. The possibility of 
Vajpayee getting another term as prime minister looks stronger. A rejuvenated BJP under Vajpayee will 
have more political maneuvering space than any other recent governing coalition. Moreover, the United 
States, in its ongoing war against terrorism, has a greater stake in peace in South Asia than in the past. 
The current process of reconciliation is partially an outcome of U.S. engagement in the region. A 
deliberate scuttling of the process by either party would have obvious consequences for its relations with 
the United States. 
Imperatives 
Caution and boldness are competing imperatives. Too much caution on part of either party could be 
misconstrued as political timidity, while excessive aggressiveness by one might lead to unnecessary 
caution by the other. One reason the 2001 Agra summit failed was inadequate groundwork prior to the 
summit. The leaders of both countries should discuss a broad framework for resumption of dialogue 
during the forthcoming meeting. However, substantive dialogue should start only after adequate 
preparation. 
South Asian leaders are prone to expressing opinion even when there is no need to express it. It is 
important that both sides' leaders exercise restraint in their statements to the public. Stephen Cohen's 
fear is real when he says that one terrorist attack or insulting remark from either side could disrupt the 
entire peace process. Any complacency on the part of the security forces could be fatal. The existing lines 
of communication ought to be kept open and functional so that any misunderstanding is urgently clarified.  
Lasting peace in the region has many hurdles in the way. A strong desire on the part of the leaders on 
both sides could lead to a situation of managed conflict. Popular mistrust of the other side restricts 
options, but increasing people-to-people interaction across the border and the LoC should serve to 
minimize such fears. Traditional transportation routes, such as between Jammu and Sialkot, should be 
considered for re-opening. India and Pakistan should promote interaction between scholars, academics, 
and other key segments of civil society on either side of the LoC in Kashmir. Official procedures and red 
tape should not be allowed to unnecessarily hinder the process. Officials need to be counseled to refrain 
from scoring political points. The media has its own stakes in covering such events. At the same time, 
authorities on both sides are required to make appropriate arrangements for coverage. 
The U.S. Role 
CCC analyst Feroz Hassan Khan has argued that the deterrence equation in South Asia now implicitly 
depends on U.S. intervention. In essence, Indian and Pakistani nuclear policies create what might be 
called the "independence-dependence paradox." India and Pakistan have attempted to wean themselves 
from outside support by acquiring nuclear weapons. But this strategy paradoxically makes them more 
dependent on American intervention to avert war.[15] Although both countries deny any outside pressure 
for the current phase of the peace process, the initiative is not entirely domestic.  
A recent study by the Council for Foreign Relations and the Asia Society suggested that the United States 
should facilitate the creation of an environment in which India and Pakistan can find peace.[16] Recent 
U.S. policy towards South Asia has emphasized crisis management, most notably during the 1999 Kargil 
Conflict and the 2001-2002 India-Pakistan military face-off. Such a reactive approach is inadequate given 
the inherent danger that an India-Pakistan crisis will one day spiral into a broader conflict, conceivably 
one involving use of nuclear weapons. U.S. diplomacy needs to be more forward leaning in South Asia, a 
shift that appears already to be underway, as evident in the continuous contact of U.S. policymakers with 
senior Indian and Pakistani officials.  
It is widely believed that as long as the United States is still involved in Afghanistan and hunting Al-Qaeda, 
Washington will not lean too hard on Pakistan. Such thinking is short-sighted. A pro-active U.S. policy 
ought to engage existing ground realities. First, radicals within Pakistan, whether fighting in the name of 
Kashmir or Afghanistan, are more harmful to Pakistan than they are to India. Recent assassination 
attempts against President Musharraf make this clear. Second, cross-border terrorism in Kashmir is a 
serious issue with India. At the same time, the Indian security apparatus has dealt with this problem with 
a fair degree of success. For Pakistan, continuing its support to cross-border terrorism amounts to 
reinforcing failure at a heavy cost. Third, Pakistan's influence over Kashmir's domestic politics is declining, 
consequently diluting prospects for Pakistani success through its avowed solution of the Kashmir issue by 
plebiscite. Fourth, India continues to outpace Pakistan in political, economic, and military terms. An 
emerging U.S.-India strategic understanding is mutually beneficial for the United States, India, and South 
Asia as a whole. A strong, politically and economically stable Pakistan is in everyone's interest, including 
India's. 
Going forward, the following steps should be taken: 
• The U.S. government should encourage President Musharraf to address Indian concerns about 
cross-border terrorism.  
• Despite the predominant role played by the military in Pakistan, the people of India and Pakistan 
and not their militaries should be the real arbiters of peace between the two countries.The U.S. 
initiative should encourage democracy and greater people-to-people interaction between the two 
countries. All economic, trade, and technology cooperation initiatives by the United States should 
be made contingent on successful democratization. 
• India should draw down security forces in Jammu and Kashmir as militancy declines. 
• Both countries should maintain the momentum of the current peace process and initiate a 
comprehensive bilateral dialogue. 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights home 
page. 
To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox at the beginning of each month, 
email ccc@nps.navy.mil with subject line "Subscribe". There is no charge, and your address will be 
used for no other purpose. 
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